IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joecth/v19y2002i2p333-353.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Pricing, learning, and strategic behavior in a single-sale model

Author

Listed:
  • Virginia Vera de Serio

    (Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, 5500 Mendoza, ARGENTINA)

  • Hector Chade

    (Department of Economics, Arizona State University, Main Campus, PO Box 873806, Tempe, AZ 85287-3806, USA)

Abstract

We analyze an infinite horizon model where a seller who owns an indivisible unit of a good for sale has incomplete information about the state of the world that determines not only the demand she faces but also her own valuation for the good. Over time, she randomly meets potential buyers who may have incentives to manipulate her learning process strategically. We show that i) the seller's incentives to post a high price and to experiment are not necessarily monotonic in the information conveyed by a buyer's rejection; and ii) as the discount factors tend to one, there are equilibria where the seller always ends up selling the good at an ex-post individually rational price.

Suggested Citation

  • Virginia Vera de Serio & Hector Chade, 2002. "Pricing, learning, and strategic behavior in a single-sale model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 19(2), pages 333-353.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:19:y:2002:i:2:p:333-353
    Note: Received: January 6, 1999; revised version: July 15, 2000
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/papers/2019002/20190333.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information revelation; Asymmetric information; Experimentation.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:19:y:2002:i:2:p:333-353. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.