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symposium articles: Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection

Author

Listed:
  • Douglas Gale

    (Department of Economics, New York University, 269 Mercer Street, New York, NY 10003, USA)

Abstract

The paper analyzes an economy with two-sided adverse selection, focusing on equilibria that satisfy a refinement based on the notion of strategic stability. In the familiar case of one-sided adverse selection, agents reveal all of their private information as long as the contract space is rich enough. However, with two-sided adverse selection, the sufficient conditions for separation are much stronger.

Suggested Citation

  • Douglas Gale, 2001. "symposium articles: Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 18(2), pages 391-414.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:18:y:2001:i:2:p:391-414
    Note: Received: September 3, 1999; revised version: December 3, 1999
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dosis, Anastasios, 2018. "On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 140-149.
    2. William Fuchs & Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo, 2015. "Optimal Contracting and the Organization of Knowledge," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(2), pages 632-658.
    3. Garicano, Luis & Fuchs, William, 2012. "Professional service outsourcing, asymmetric information and wage inequality," CEPR Discussion Papers 9137, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Prasenjit Banerjee & Jason F. Shogren, 2013. "Climate Change: Risk, Reputation, and Mechanism Design," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1303, Economics, The University of Manchester.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Signaling; Adverse selection; Markets; Rationing; Types; Equilibrium; Refinement; Strategic stability; Walrasian.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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