IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joecth/v15y2000i1p55-102.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes

Author

Listed:
  • Donald G. Saari

    (Department of Mathematics, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208-2730, USA)

Abstract

A theory is developed to explain all positional voting outcomes that can result from a single but arbitrarily chosen profile. This includes all outcomes, paradoxes, and disagreements among positional procedure outcomes as well as all discrepancies in rankings as candidates are dropped or added. The theory explains why each outcome occurs while identifying all illustrating profiles. It is shown how to use this approach to derive properties of methods based on pairwise and positional voting outcomes. Pairwise voting is addressed in the preceding companion paper [15]; the theory for positional methods is developed here.

Suggested Citation

  • Donald G. Saari, 2000. "Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 15(1), pages 55-102.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:15:y:2000:i:1:p:55-102
    Note: Received: November 19, 1998; revised version: February 14, 1999
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/papers/0015001/00150055.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Aleksei Yu. Kondratev & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2018. "Measuring Majority Tyranny: Axiomatic Approach," HSE Working papers WP BRP 194/EC/2018, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:15:y:2000:i:1:p:55-102. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.