Learning buyers' valuation distribution in posted-price selling
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Abstract
Suggested Citation
Note: Received: May 12, 1998; revised version: July 7, 1998
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Other versions of this item:
- Chen, Yongmin & Wang, Ruqu, 1997. "Learning buyers' valuation distribution in posted-price selling," Queen's Institute for Economic Research Discussion Papers 273387, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Walter Beckert, 2004. "Dynamic Monopolies with Stochastic Demand," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0404, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
- H. Müge Yayla‐Küllü & Jennifer K. Ryan & Jayashankar M. Swaminathan, 2021. "Product Line Flexibility for Agile and Adaptable Operations," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(3), pages 725-737, March.
- Gershkov, Alex & Moldovanu, Benny, 2012.
"Optimal search, learning and implementation,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 881-909.
- Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu, 2010. "Optimal Search, Learning and Implementation," Discussion Paper Series dp543, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Benny Moldovanu & Alex Gershkov, 2008. "The Trade-off Between Fast Learning and Dynamic Efficiency," 2008 Meeting Papers 348, Society for Economic Dynamics.
More about this item
Keywords
Price determination; Posted-price selling; Learning.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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