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Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining

Author

Listed:
  • Antonio Merlo

    (Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, 271 19th Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA)

  • Charles Wilson

    (Department of Economics, New York University, New York, NY 10003, USA)

Abstract

We consider a k-player sequential bargaining model in which both the cake size and the identity of the proposer are determined by a stochastic process. For the case where the cake is a simplex (of random size) and the players share a common discount factor, we establish the existence of a unique stationary subgame perfect payoff which is efficient and characterize the conditions under which agreement is delayed. We also investigate how the equilibrium payoffs depend on the order in which the players move and on the correlation between the identity of the proposer and the cake size.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Merlo & Charles Wilson, 1997. "Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(1), pages 39-55.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:11:y:1997:i:1:p:39-55
    Note: Received: November 5, 1996; revised version: December 31, 1996
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-037, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    2. Ricardo Lagos & Guillaume Rocheteau, 2009. "Liquidity in Asset Markets With Search Frictions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 403-426, March.
    3. Antonio Merlo & Xun Tang, 2009. "Identification of Stochastic Sequential Bargaining Models," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-037, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    4. Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 2000. "Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 46-79, September.
    5. Antonio Merlo & Xun Tang, 2010. "Identification and Estimation of Stochastic Bargaining Models, Third Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 11 Mar 2011.
    6. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "Bargaining and Majority Rules: A Collective Search Perspective," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(2), pages 189-221, April.
    7. Sven de Vries & Rakesh Vohra, 2000. "A Structural Model of Government Formation," Discussion Papers 1297, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    8. Marcus Miller & Dania Thomas, 2007. "Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Judge, the Vultures and Creditor Rights," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(10), pages 1491-1509, October.
    9. Merlo, Antonio, 1997. "Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 101-131, February.
    10. Diermeier, Daniel & Eraslan, Hülya & Merlo, Antonio, 2007. "Bicameralism and Government Formation," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 227-252, August.
    11. Breitmoser, Yves, 2011. "Binomial menu auctions in government formation," MPRA Paper 28576, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Ghosal, Sayantan & Miller, Marcus & Thampanishvong, Kannika, 2010. "Delay and Haircuts in Sovereign Debt: Recovery and Sustainability," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-17, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    13. Carlos Diaz-Moreno & Jose E. Galdon-Sanchez, 2000. "Collective Bargaining under Complete Information," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 401, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    14. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2002. "Bicameralism and Government Formation, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-010, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Feb 2007.
    15. Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005.
    16. Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2008. "On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(3), pages 509-519, December.
    17. Benjamin, David, 2006. "Fast bargaining in bankruptcy," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0601, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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