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Matching and bargaining models of markets: approximating small markets by large markets

Author

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  • John Wooders

    (Department of Economics, McClelland Hall, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 8572-0108, USA)

Abstract

We show that the equilibrium of a matching and bargaining model of a market in which there is a finite number of agents at each date need not be near the equilibrium of a market with a continuum of agents, although matching probabilities are the same in both markets. Holding the matching process fixed, as the finite market becomes large its equilibrium approaches the equilibrium of its continuum limit.

Suggested Citation

  • John Wooders, 1997. "Matching and bargaining models of markets: approximating small markets by large markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(1), pages 215-224.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:11:y:1997:i:1:p:215-224
    Note: Received: January 22, 1996; revised version: September 24, 1996
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    Cited by:

    1. Yves Breitmoser, 2012. "Proto-coalition bargaining and the core," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(3), pages 581-599, November.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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