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Privatization Neutrality Theorem: When a Public Firm Pursues General Objectives

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  • Kojun Hamada

    (Niigata University)

Abstract

This paper examines the privatization neutrality theorem when a public firm pursues general objectives other than welfare maximization. This theorem states that when the government gives firms optimal subsidies, welfare is exactly the same before and after privatization. However, we present a seemingly paradoxical result. When a public firm incorrectly assumes that subsidies change the welfare size, privatization is necessarily welfare neutral, whereas when the public firm correctly recognizes that subsidies only bring about income redistribution, without affecting welfare, the situations in which neutrality holds are limited.

Suggested Citation

  • Kojun Hamada, 2018. "Privatization Neutrality Theorem: When a Public Firm Pursues General Objectives," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 59-68, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jecrev:v:69:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1111_jere.12143
    DOI: 10.1111/jere.12143
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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    D43; H42; H44; L13;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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