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Apportionment Behind the Veil of Uncertainty

Author

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  • Junichiro Wada

    (Yokohama City University)

Abstract

Apportionment of representatives is a basic rule of everyday politics. By definition, this basic rule is a constitutional stage problem and should be decided behind the veil of uncertainty. To bring apportionment closer to quotas, we introduce f-divergence for utilitarianism and Bregman divergence for consistent optimization. Even in our less restricted condition, we find that we must use α-divergence for optimization and show that the minimization of α-divergence induces the same divisor methods that correspond to the maximization of the Kolm–Atkinson social welfare function (or the expected utility function), which is bounded by constant relative risk aversion.

Suggested Citation

  • Junichiro Wada, 2016. "Apportionment Behind the Veil of Uncertainty," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 67(3), pages 348-360, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jecrev:v:67:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1111_jere.12093
    DOI: 10.1111/jere.12093
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    Cited by:

    1. Wada, Junichiro & Kamahara, Yuta, 2018. "Studying malapportionment using α-divergence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 77-89.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    D63; D72;

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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