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A theory of hegemon-provoked instability, with an application to NATO and the Ukraine-Russia war

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  • Mukesh Eswaran

    (University of British Columbia)

Abstract

This paper sets out a simple model of political realism where a nation’s security is deemed primary and examines the actions of a hegemon in seeking to protect its hegemony. Contrary to the received view that the presence of a hegemon is beneficial to the world in promoting prosperity and peace, in the contemporary scenario in which there has been a unipolar hegemon in the last three decades, it is in the interest of the hegemon to stir up instability elsewhere. The presence of a military-industrial complex is shown to benefit the hegemon through this instability, even at the expense of its allies. First, it induces greater defense expenditures on the part of its allies, which the hegemon can free-ride on and, second, it earns profits for the hegemon from the sale of weapons to its allies. The validity of the theory is shown in the case of the Ukraine-Russia war, in which NATO (comprising the hegemon, United States, and its allies in the European Union) are pitted against Russia. The paper casts serious doubt on the neoliberal justification that NATO offers for its expansionary actions eastward in Europe.

Suggested Citation

  • Mukesh Eswaran, 2024. "A theory of hegemon-provoked instability, with an application to NATO and the Ukraine-Russia war," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 349-383, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:inecre:v:59:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s41775-024-00241-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s41775-024-00241-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Hegemony; Instability; NATO; U.S.; Russia; Ukraine;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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