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Enhancing climate resilience of transboundary water allocation agreements: the impact of shortening the agreement’s lifetime on cooperation stability

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  • Maryam Jafroudi

Abstract

Efficient use of transboundary rivers under climate change requires periodic adaptation of their governing regime to the hydrological realities of the basin. Applying a short-term time horizon to an agreement on water allocation can make it easier for the riparian states to update the terms of their cooperation periodically, and thus, adapt them to changes in water availability resulting from climate change. However, agreements with a pre-agreed termination date can only increase the efficiency of water use if they lead to a stable cooperation. In this paper, I analyze how riparian states’ previous knowledge of the termination date of a water allocation agreement affects the agreement’s stability. The results show that when riparian states are aware of the agreement’s termination date, there is a higher chance for them to free-ride. However, certain cases may occur in which previous knowledge of the agreement’s termination date can contribute to the stability of an agreement by enforcing compliance.

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  • Maryam Jafroudi, 2018. "Enhancing climate resilience of transboundary water allocation agreements: the impact of shortening the agreement’s lifetime on cooperation stability," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(5), pages 707-722, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ieaple:v:18:y:2018:i:5:d:10.1007_s10784-018-9412-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s10784-018-9412-2
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    Cited by:

    1. Charlotte De Bruyne & Itay Fischhendler & Yoram Z. Haftel, 2020. "Design and change in transboundary freshwater agreements," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 162(2), pages 321-341, September.
    2. Naho Mirumachi & Margot Hurlbert, 2022. "Reflecting on twenty years of international agreements concerning water governance: insights and key learning," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 317-332, June.
    3. Imad Antoine Ibrahim & Jonathan Lautze, 2023. "How best to incorporate conjunctive water management into international water law: legal amendment, instrument coupling, or new protocol adoption?," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 333-353, September.
    4. Ibrahim, I. A. & Lautze, Jonathan, 2023. "How best to incorporate conjunctive water management into international water law: legal amendment, instrument coupling, or new protocol adoption?," Papers published in Journals (Open Access), International Water Management Institute, pages 1-21.().

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