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Negotiating Effectively: Justice in International Environmental Negotiations

Author

Listed:
  • Cecilia Albin

    (Uppsala University)

  • Daniel Druckman

    (George Mason University
    Macquarie University
    University of Queensland)

Abstract

Are negotiators who rely on justice principles in the process of bargaining and drafting agreements more—or rather less—effective than others? This article examines whether adherence to principles of procedural and distributive justice in negotiations contributes to more effective results, with a focus on international environmental negotiations. Effectiveness is defined in terms of the extent of agreement (among parties and on issues), time to reach agreement, and comprehensiveness of the agreement. A set of hypotheses is evaluated on a selection of bilateral and multilateral cases of environmental negotiations, using statistical methods. The analyses reveal that adherence to principles of procedural justice contributes to more effective results in multilateral environmental negotiations. These principles are found to hinder effectiveness in the bilateral cases. On the other hand, adherence to principles of distributive justice is only moderately related to effectiveness in both the bilateral and multilateral cases.

Suggested Citation

  • Cecilia Albin & Daniel Druckman, 2017. "Negotiating Effectively: Justice in International Environmental Negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 93-113, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:26:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-016-9509-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-016-9509-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lange, Andreas & Löschel, Andreas & Vogt, Carsten & Ziegler, Andreas, 2010. "On the self-interested use of equity in international climate negotiations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 359-375, April.
    2. Lange, Andreas & Vogt, Carsten & Ziegler, Andreas, 2007. "On the importance of equity in international climate policy: An empirical analysis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 545-562, May.
    3. Christian Downie, 2013. "Three Ways to Understand State Actors in International Negotiations: Climate Change in the Clinton Years (1993–2000)," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 13(4), pages 22-40, November.
    4. Brendan Coolsaet & John Pitseys, 2015. "Fair and Equitable Negotiations? African Influence and the International Access and Benefit-Sharing Regime," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 15(2), pages 38-56, May.
    5. Frohlich, Norman & Oppenheimer, Joe A. & Eavey, Cheryl L., 1987. "Laboratory Results on Rawls's Distributive Justice," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 1-21, January.
    6. Daniel Druckman, 1994. "Determinants of Compromising Behavior in Negotiation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(3), pages 507-556, September.
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