The Optimal Bargain between the Elite and the Majority: Party and Managerial Ideologies as Devices to Control Politicians and Managers
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-010-9220-8
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Keywords
Transaction costs; Allocative efficiency; Altruism; Models of political processes; Conflict; conflict resolution; and alliances; Asymmetric and private info; Corporate governance; Structure and performance of government; General legal; Corporate culture;All these keywords.
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