IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/eurphb/v90y2017i1d10.1140_epjb_e2016-70471-1.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Delayed response in the Hawk Dove game

Author

Listed:
  • James Burridge

    (University of Portsmouth)

  • Yu Gao

    (School of Physics and Astronomy, University of Nottingham)

  • Yong Mao

    (School of Physics and Astronomy, University of Nottingham)

Abstract

We consider a group of agents playing the Hawk-Dove game. These agents have a finite memory of past interactions which they use to optimize their play. By both analytical and numerical approaches, we show that an instability occurs at a critical memory length, and we provide its characterization. We show also that when the game is stable, having a long memory is beneficial but that instability, which may be produced by excessively long memory, hands the advantage to those with shorter memories.

Suggested Citation

  • James Burridge & Yu Gao & Yong Mao, 2017. "Delayed response in the Hawk Dove game," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 90(1), pages 1-6, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:eurphb:v:90:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1140_epjb_e2016-70471-1
    DOI: 10.1140/epjb/e2016-70471-1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1140/epjb/e2016-70471-1
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1140/epjb/e2016-70471-1?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert Sugden, 2005. "Rights, Co-operation and Welfare," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare, chapter 9, pages 170-182, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Robert Sugden, 2005. "The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-0-230-53679-1, December.
    3. Ding, Fei & Liu, Yun & Shen, Bo & Si, Xia-Meng, 2010. "An evolutionary game theory model of binary opinion formation," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 389(8), pages 1745-1752.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Wettergren, Thomas A., 2021. "Replicator dynamics of an N-player snowdrift game with delayed payoffs," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 404(C).
    2. Yuan, Hairui & Meng, Xinzhu, 2022. "Replicator dynamics of division of labor games with delayed payoffs in infinite populations," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    3. Wettergren, Thomas A., 2023. "Replicator dynamics of evolutionary games with different delays on costs and benefits," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 458(C).
    4. Burridge, James & Gnacik, Michał, 2022. "Public efforts to reduce disease transmission implied from a spatial game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 589(C).
    5. Chongyi Zhong & Hui Yang & Zixin Liu & Juanyong Wu, 2020. "Stability of Replicator Dynamics with Bounded Continuously Distributed Time Delay," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(3), pages 1-12, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Robert Sugden, 2008. "Is there a distinction between morality and convention?," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 08-01, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    2. Jelle De Boer, 2017. "Social Preferences and Context Sensitivity," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-15, October.
    3. Tom Lane & Daniele Nosenzo & Silvia Sonderegger, 2023. "Law and Norms: Empirical Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(5), pages 1255-1293, May.
    4. Nicola Campigotto, 2021. "Pairwise imitation and evolution of the social contract," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 1333-1354, September.
    5. Zachary Garfield & Ryan Schacht & Emily Post & Dominique Ingram & Andrea Uehling & Shane Macfarlan, 2021. "The content and structure of reputation domains across human societies: a view from the evolutionary social sciences," Post-Print hal-03368986, HAL.
    6. Erik W. Matson & Daniel B. Klein, 2022. "Convention without convening," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 1-24, March.
    7. Minnameier, Gerhard & Bonowski, Tim Jonas, 2021. "Morality and Trust in Impersonal Relationships," VfS Annual Conference 2021 (Virtual Conference): Climate Economics 242438, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Amirova, Iroda & Petrick, Martin & Djanibekov, Nodir, 2022. "Community, state and market: Understanding historical water governance evolution in Central Asia," IAMO Discussion Papers 327298, Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO).
    9. María Cecilia Gimenez & Luis Reinaudi & Ana Pamela Paz-García & Paulo Marcelo Centres & Antonio José Ramirez-Pastor, 2021. "Opinion evolution in the presence of constant propaganda: homogeneous and localized cases," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 94(1), pages 1-11, January.
    10. Lopez-Pina, A. & Losada, J.C. & Benito, R.M., 2019. "Competition games between teams vying for common resources under consensus dynamics on networks," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 534(C).
    11. Wang, Tao & Huang, Keke & Cheng, Yuan & Zheng, Xiaoping, 2015. "Understanding herding based on a co-evolutionary model for strategy and game structure," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 84-90.
    12. Soares, João P.M. & Fontanari, José F., 2024. "N-player game formulation of the majority-vote model of opinion dynamics," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 643(C).
    13. Lin, XuXun & Yuan, PengCheng, 2018. "A dynamic parking charge optimal control model under perspective of commuters’ evolutionary game behavior," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 490(C), pages 1096-1110.
    14. Otto, Ilona M. & Wiedermann, Marc & Cremades, Roger & Donges, Jonathan F. & Auer, Cornelia & Lucht, Wolfgang, 2020. "Human agency in the Anthropocene," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    15. Balankin, Alexander S. & Martínez Cruz, Miguel Ángel & Martínez, Alfredo Trejo, 2011. "Effect of initial concentration and spatial heterogeneity of active agent distribution on opinion dynamics," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 390(21), pages 3876-3887.
    16. Zhe Zhan & Anjing Fan, 2022. "How to Promote Quality and Equity of Early Childhood Education for Sustainable Development in Undeveloped Rural Areas of China: An Evolutionary Game Study," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(24), pages 1-16, December.
    17. Maciel, Marcelo V. & Martins, André C.R., 2020. "Ideologically motivated biases in a multiple issues opinion model," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 553(C).
    18. repec:zbw:iamodp:327298 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Angelo Antoci & Guido Ferilli & Paolo Russu & Pier Luigi Sacco, 2020. "Rational populists: the social consequences of shared narratives," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 479-506, April.
    20. Jianlei Zhang & Chunyan Zhang & Tianguang Chu & Franz J Weissing, 2014. "Cooperation in Networks Where the Learning Environment Differs from the Interaction Environment," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(3), pages 1-8, March.
    21. Luke Marris & Ian Gemp & Georgios Piliouras, 2023. "Equilibrium-Invariant Embedding, Metric Space, and Fundamental Set of $2\times2$ Normal-Form Games," Papers 2304.09978, arXiv.org.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Statistical and Nonlinear Physics;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:eurphb:v:90:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1140_epjb_e2016-70471-1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.