The impact of power dynamics on international climate commitments: a case study of the USA–Iran over climate action and economic sanctions

This research brings a fresh approach by employing a game theoretic analysis of the US–Iran confrontation, based on a sanctions game model in the normal form introduced by Tsebelis (JCR 30:3–28, 1990), to investigate the intertwined factors of power dynamics and economic sanctions on Iran’s hesitancy in ratifying the Paris agreement, with a particular focus on the implications for climate cooperative efforts. The study’s findings demonstrated that Iran’s preferred outcome involves the lifting of US sanctions, along with the ratification of the Paris agreement and adherence to its unconditional NDC commitments. In contrast, the USA appears to favour maintaining sanctions on Iran, while Iran unofficially ratifies the Paris agreement. Having indicated that its ratification is contingent upon receiving international financial assistance and technology transfer, Iran strategically utilizes the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as a means to achieve either the relief of US sanctions or conditional ratification of the Paris agreement, driven by concerns regarding its vulnerable economy. This study also highlights the significant concerns regarding the impact of US power dynamics on Iran’s international climate commitments and how imbalances of power can hinder the implementation of climate commitments and sustainable development.