Fuel consumption and carbon emission reduction strategies in a fuel vehicle supply chain under auto double credit policy and carbon social responsibility

This paper develops a dual Stackelberg game model to investigate the production and consumption of two-sided carbon reduction issues in a fuel car supply chain. It involves a government, a manufacturer, and multiple retailers. The government is the first to issue dual credit and fuel tax policies to regulate carbon-related decisions in the automotive supply chain. Followed by the manufacturer, who makes in-production carbon reduction and fuel reduction investments under established government policies and its carbon social responsibility, and the final actor, the retailer, conducts product marketing and sales. Using this model, we analyze the decentralized decision-making, cost-sharing, and revenue-sharing between supply chain members. The results show: (1) For both types of coordination, cost-sharing leads to higher profits for all supply chain members and social welfare, while fuel consumption reduction and carbon emissions in production are higher under revenue-sharing. (2) Ecological performance improvement with double credit price linearly, but the level of social welfare tends to increase first and then decrease. Therefore, the government should carefully choose the severity of the double credit policy by considering ecological and economic performance goals.