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Incumbency preservation through electoral legislation: The case of the secret ballot

Author

Listed:
  • Jac C. Heckelman
  • Andrew J. Yates

Abstract

The secret ballot was designed to eliminate the incentive for candidates to purchase votes through direct vote buying. When voters have private information on their candidate preferences, incumbent candidates will generally be less efficient in purchasing votes than their challengers. Incumbent candidates may therefore benefit from the elimination of direct vote purchasing. Viewed in this vein, passage of secret ballot laws by state legislatures can be seen as an institutional mechanism to protect their incumbency advantage, rather than as an act of necessary electoral reform to create fair elections and protect democracy. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Suggested Citation

  • Jac C. Heckelman & Andrew J. Yates, 2002. "Incumbency preservation through electoral legislation: The case of the secret ballot," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 47-57, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:3:y:2002:i:1:p:47-57
    DOI: 10.1007/s101010000020
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Toke Aidt & Zareh Asatryan & Lusine Badalyan & Friedrich Heinemann, 2020. "Vote Buying or (Political) Business (Cycles) as Usual?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 409-425, July.
    2. Tatjana Vukelić, 2022. "Black Awakening in Obama’s America: The End of an Illusion," European Journal of Social Sciences Articles, Revistia Research and Publishing, vol. 6, January -.
    3. Alan S. Gerber & Gregory A. Huber & David Doherty & Conor M. Dowling & Seth J. Hill, 2011. "Do Perceptions of Ballot Secrecy Influence Turnout? Results from a Field Experiment," NBER Working Papers 17673, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Aidt, T.S. & Jensen, P.S., 2012. "From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1221, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Key words: Secret ballot; vote market; incumbency advantage; JEL Classification: D72;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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