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Butter and guns: Complementarity between economic and military competition

Author

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  • Herschel I. Grossman
  • Juan Mendoza

Abstract

This paper analyses a general-equilibrium model of the complementarity between economic competition for the allegiance of subjects and military competition for the control of land. In our model economic competition between rival rulers for the allegiance of subjects results in their subjects, whether they are producers or soldiers, receiving incomes equal to the value of the marginal product of a producer. Furthermore, abstracting from destruction, military competition for the control of land, to the extent that it shifts some subjects from producing to soldiering, increases the value of the marginal product of a producer. Consequently, as long as military competition is not too destructive, the subjects of rival rulers have higher incomes with both military and economic competition than with economic competition alone. Economic competition for the allegiance of subjects causes rival rulers to bear all of the cost of allocating production to military competition and to bear more than the cost of the foregone production of soldiers. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Suggested Citation

  • Herschel I. Grossman & Juan Mendoza, 2001. "Butter and guns: Complementarity between economic and military competition," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 25-33, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:2:y:2001:i:1:p:25-33
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Antoine Pietri & Tarik Tazdait & Mehrdad Vahabi, 2013. "Empire Building and Price Competition," Post-Print hal-00832240, HAL.
    2. Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich, 2009. "Эндогенные Границы И Распределение Власти В Федерациях И Международных Сообществах [ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION OF POWER In the Federation]," MPRA Paper 16473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Subhasish Chowdhury & Roman Sheremeta, 2011. "A generalized Tullock contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 413-420, June.
    4. Dario Maimone Ansaldo Patti & Pietro Navarra & Giuseppe Sobbrio, 2022. "Insecure Property Rights and Conflicts: How to Solve Them?," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-32, December.
    5. Obreja Brasoveanu, Laura, 2010. "The Impact of Defense Expenditure on Economic Growth," Journal for Economic Forecasting, Institute for Economic Forecasting, vol. 0(4), pages 148-167, December.
    6. Subhashish Modak Chowdhury & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2009. "A generalized Tullock contest and the existence of multiple equilibria," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 09-08, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Key words: military; allegiance; territory; rulers; soldiers; JEL classification: D74;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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