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Discipline by turnout

Author

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  • Dong-Hee Joe

    (Keimyung University)

Abstract

This paper explores the possibility that voter turnout induces subsequent performance from the elected official, in a two-period signaling-game model of political agency. An election is held in each period to delegate a policy decision to a politician whose policy preferences are private information. A representative voter decides, in each election, whether to vote for a politician or abstain, and voting incurs a cost which is private information. With ex-ante identical politicians, turning out in the first election is statically not optimal for the voter. However, she may still do so to signal her willingness—low cost—to punish a wrong policy in the following election.

Suggested Citation

  • Dong-Hee Joe, 2023. "Discipline by turnout," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 501-518, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:24:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s10101-023-00301-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00301-9
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voter turnout; Political agency;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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