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The community currency game “Online Shopping.com”: the prisoner’s dilemma and consumer behavior in a local economy

Author

Listed:
  • Masaaki Abe

    (Niigata Sangyo University)

  • Hitoshi Utsunomiya

    (Taisho University)

  • Miyoshi Hirano

    (Niigata Sangyo University)

Abstract

The decline of local economies has become more serious in recent years. The reason for the widening regional disparities is the drain of people, goods, and money from local economies. Community currencies are considered to be a possible solution to the problem of regional disparities. However, it is rare for a community currency to succeed in local revitalization. The “community currency game” aims to elucidate the effects of local revitalization through experimental trading using a community currency. In this paper, we present a community currency game that aims to increase understanding of the mechanism by which the prisoner’s dilemma affects the behavior of consumers in a local economy. The community currency game “Online Shopping.com” consists of three mini games. The first is the “silent trading game”, the second is the “conversational trading game”, and the third is the “conversational trading game with community currency”. In game 3, we found that most participants chose the town stores. Also, the gross domestic product of the town (total amount purchased in the town) increased. Through the three games, we learned that community currencies have the power to allow participants to escape from the prisoner’s dilemma.

Suggested Citation

  • Masaaki Abe & Hitoshi Utsunomiya & Miyoshi Hirano, 2020. "The community currency game “Online Shopping.com”: the prisoner’s dilemma and consumer behavior in a local economy," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 345-360, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:eaiere:v:17:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s40844-020-00179-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s40844-020-00179-w
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Community currency game; Prisoner’s dilemma; Local economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • R1 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics

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