IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/annopr/v89y1999i0p215-23010.1023-a1018927723944.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Markov Perfect Equilibria for a classof capital accumulation games

Author

Listed:
  • E.J. Dockner
  • M. Plank
  • K. Nishimura

Abstract

We formulate a class of dynamic games which consists of so‐called capital accumulationgames. In such games, rival firms invest strategically in a stock of physical capital. Thecapital stocks of all firms in the industry are the state variables of the game and firms usethe rate of change of the capital stocks as their control variables. It is assumed that currentprofits of a firm are not only dependent on the firm's own capital stock, but also on thestock of capital of the rival firm. We prove existence of multiple Markov Perfect Equilibria(MPE) and study their qualitative characteristics. It turns out that there exist two differenttypes of equilibria: a strict equilibrium that is degenerate and coincides with the uniqueopen‐loop one and so‐called indifferent equilibria that are non‐strict. For both types, westudy the equilibrium dynamics. While the strict equilibrium is characterized by simpleequilibrium dynamics, the indifferent equilibria may exhibit complex dynamic behaviour. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

Suggested Citation

  • E.J. Dockner & M. Plank & K. Nishimura, 1999. "Markov Perfect Equilibria for a classof capital accumulation games," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 89(0), pages 215-230, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:89:y:1999:i:0:p:215-230:10.1023/a:1018927723944
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1018927723944
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1018927723944
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1023/A:1018927723944?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Takuma Kunieda & Kazuo Nishimura, 2018. "Finance and Economic Growth in a Dynamic Game," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 588-600, September.
    2. Gustav Feichtinger & Richard F. Hartl & Peter M. Kort & Andrea Seidl & Stefan Wrzaczek, 2022. "Asymmetric Information in a Capital Accumulation Differential Game with Spillover and Learning Effects," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 194(3), pages 878-895, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:89:y:1999:i:0:p:215-230:10.1023/a:1018927723944. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.