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Dynamics in divide the money game with bribing

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  • V. Pasetta

Abstract

This paper addresses a class of divide asset games with externalities, where transfersamong players are not observed over the traditional economic devices but may, nevertheless,crucially determine the outcome of the game. In particular, the issues are discussed over adivide the money game where externalities take the form of bribes. The theory of operatoralgebras in dynamical systems and the theory of unbounded derivations are applied to obtainan insight into economic phenomena, embodying a process of formation and institutionalizationof externalities that arise and are in focus within this setting of the model. Thesuggested approach offers a better insight into the flows of economic wealth among theagents, and can be effectively used in searching for an optimal control of transfers in conflictsituations within a nonstandard economic environment. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

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  • V. Pasetta, 1999. "Dynamics in divide the money game with bribing," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 88(0), pages 361-377, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:88:y:1999:i:0:p:361-377:10.1023/a:1018950901654
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1018950901654
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    Cited by:

    1. Roy Cerqueti & Raffaella Coppier, 2016. "A game theoretical analysis of the impact of income inequality and ethnic diversity on fiscal corruption," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 243(1), pages 71-87, August.
    2. Pham Khanh & Nguyen Khac Minh & Nguyen Thi Xuan Thu, 2022. "An optimization approach to the link between productivity, relocation cost and corruption," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 312(1), pages 427-439, May.
    3. Jandhyala, Srividya & Oliveira, Fernando S., 2021. "The role of international anti-corruption regulations in promoting socially responsible practices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 15-32.

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