IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/annopr/v346y2025i2d10.1007_s10479-024-05847-3.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A dynamic game approach for optimal consumption, investment and life insurance problem

Author

Listed:
  • Rosario Maggistro

    (University of Trieste)

  • Mario Marino

    (University of Trieste)

  • Antonio Martire

    (University La Sapienza Roma)

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a multi-agent portfolio optimization model with life insurance for two players with random lifetime under a dynamic game approach. Each player is a price-taker and invests in the market to maximize her own utility for consumption and bequest. The market is complete and consists of n different assets, of which $$n-1$$ n - 1 are risky with prices driven by Geometric Brownian motion, while one is risk-free. We analyze both the non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios, and by considering the family of CRRA utility functions, we determine the closed-form expressions of the optimal consumption, investment, and life insurance for both players. A sensitivity analysis is provided both to illustrate the impact of the biometric and risk aversion parameters on the optimal controls and to compare the non-cooperative strategies with the cooperative ones. As a result, we suggest that cooperation favors the consumption optimality, while non-cooperation promotes the coverage of the risk of death.

Suggested Citation

  • Rosario Maggistro & Mario Marino & Antonio Martire, 2025. "A dynamic game approach for optimal consumption, investment and life insurance problem," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 346(2), pages 1377-1398, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:346:y:2025:i:2:d:10.1007_s10479-024-05847-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-024-05847-3
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10479-024-05847-3
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10479-024-05847-3?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic games; Non-cooperative vs cooperative games; Portfolio choice; Lifetime uncertainty; Life insurance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:346:y:2025:i:2:d:10.1007_s10479-024-05847-3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.