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The antagonism and cohesion of the upstream supply chain under information asymmetry

Author

Listed:
  • Aijun Liu

    (Xidian University)

  • Senhao Luo

    (Xidian University)

  • Jian Mou

    (Pusan National University)

  • Hongwei Qiu

    (Xidian University)

Abstract

Information asymmetry leads to short-term competitive antagonism between downstream manufacturers and upstream suppliers. This paper applies a master-slave game to reproduce the interest conflict between a manufacturer and a supplier, and proposes a cooperative decision-making model based on information sharing, considering the interest consistency of upstream supply chain members. Additionally, the overall profit coordination mechanism is constructed to ensure the continuation of the cooperative decision-making relationship. In addition, to ensure that the supplier participating in cooperative decision-making has the supply capacity desired by the manufacturer, a rational evaluation system combined with game theory is employed to determine the most suitable participating supplier. A numerical example is given to demonstrate the systematization and effectiveness of the proposed method. Finally, through sensitivity analysis and comparative analysis, managerial insights and recommendations are obtained.

Suggested Citation

  • Aijun Liu & Senhao Luo & Jian Mou & Hongwei Qiu, 2023. "The antagonism and cohesion of the upstream supply chain under information asymmetry," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 329(1), pages 527-572, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:329:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-020-03881-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-020-03881-5
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