IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sgh/gosnar/y2023i1p41-65.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Optimal Labour Income Taxation in Poland: The Case of High-Income Earners

Author

Listed:
  • Maciej Dudek
  • Paweł Dudek
  • Konrad Walczyk

Abstract

In this paper, we use actual data provided by the Polish tax authority and characterise the properties of income distribution in Poland in the case of high-income earners. By employing a variety of techniques we are able to confirm that the distribution of income in Poland can be approximated with a Pareto distribution in its upper tail. This finding makes the formula for the optimal marginal tax rates of Saez [2001] applicable to the Polish case and allows us to provide estimates of the optimal marginal tax rates for Poland. We show that the current tax policy in Poland is not optimal. Specifically, we show, by relying on empirically viable estimates of the elasticity of the labour supply with respect to the wage, that the optimal marginal tax rate at high income levels exceeds 60%. In other words, we suggest that there is room for a welfare-improving reform in Poland, and we argue that high-income individuals should be expected to contribute substantially more at the margin than they currently do.

Suggested Citation

  • Maciej Dudek & Paweł Dudek & Konrad Walczyk, 2023. "Optimal Labour Income Taxation in Poland: The Case of High-Income Earners," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 1, pages 41-65.
    • Handle: RePEc:sgh:gosnar:y:2023:i:1:p:41-65
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://gnpje.sgh.waw.pl/pdf-159031-88814
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Anthony B. Atkinson & Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, 2011. "Top Incomes in the Long Run of History," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(1), pages 3-71, March.
    2. Seade, J. K., 1977. "On the shape of optimal tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 203-235, April.
    3. Tuomala, Matti, 1990. "Optimal Income Tax and Redistribution," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198286059.
    4. Lollivier, Stefan & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1983. "Bunching and second-order conditions: A note on optimal tax theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 392-400, December.
    5. Matti Tuomala, 2010. "On optimal non-linear income taxation: numerical results revisited," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 17(3), pages 259-270, June.
    6. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie Stantcheva, 2014. "Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 230-271, February.
    7. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Camille Landais & Emmanuel Saez, 2013. "Taxation and International Migration of Superstars: Evidence from the European Football Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(5), pages 1892-1924, August.
    8. Ebert, Udo, 1992. "A reexamination of the optimal nonlinear income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 47-73, October.
    9. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-00944873 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. N. Gregory Mankiw, 2013. "Defending the One Percent," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 21-34, Summer.
    11. Emmanuel Saez, 2001. "Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(1), pages 205-229.
    12. Revesz, John T, 1989. "The Optimal Taxation of Labour Income," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 44(3), pages 453-475.
    13. X. RUIZ del PORTAL, 2007. "The Problem of Optimum Income Taxation: A Remark on Its Monotonicity Constraint," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(2), pages 265-283, April.
    14. Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, 2011. "The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(4), pages 165-190, Fall.
    15. Louis Kaplow, 2010. "Concavity of utility, concavity of welfare, and redistribution of income," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 17(1), pages 25-42, February.
    16. Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie Stantcheva, 2016. "Generalized Social Marginal Welfare Weights for Optimal Tax Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(1), pages 24-45, January.
    17. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1982. "Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1345-1370, November.
    18. Kopczuk, Wojciech, 2005. "Tax bases, tax rates and the elasticity of reported income," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(11-12), pages 2093-2119, December.
    19. Diamond, Peter A, 1998. "Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-Shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 83-95, March.
    20. Michał Myck & Kajetan Trzciński, 2019. "From Partial to Full Universality: The Family 500+ Programme in Poland and its Labor Supply Implications," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 17(03), pages 36-44, October.
    21. Judd, Kenneth L. & Guu, Sy-Ming, 1997. "Asymptotic methods for aggregate growth models," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 1025-1042, June.
    22. Sen, Amartya, 1973. "On Economic Inequality," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198281931.
    23. Efraim Sadka, 1976. "On Income Distribution, Incentive Effects and Optimal Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 43(2), pages 261-267.
    24. Jonathan David Ostry & Andrew Berg & Charalambos G Tsangarides, 2014. "Redistribution, Inequality, and Growth," IMF Staff Discussion Notes 14/02, International Monetary Fund.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, 2012. "Optimal Labor Income Taxation," NBER Working Papers 18521, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Morten Nyborg Støstad & Frank Cowell, 2021. "Inequality as an Externality: Consequences for Tax Design," PSE Working Papers halshs-03495989, HAL.
    3. Boadway, Robin & Jacquet, Laurence, 2008. "Optimal marginal and average income taxation under maximin," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 425-441, November.
    4. Oztek, Abdullah Selim, 2019. "A Characterization for Marginal Income Tax Schedules," MPRA Paper 103046, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Dec 2019.
    5. Støstad, Morten Nyborg & Cowell, Frank, 2024. "Inequality as an externality: consequences for tax design," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 123752, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Bergstrom, Katy & Dodds, William, 2021. "Optimal taxation with multiple dimensions of heterogeneity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    7. Georges Casamatta, 2021. "Optimal income taxation with tax avoidance," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(3), pages 534-550, June.
    8. Amedeo Spadaro, 2002. "Redistribución e incentivos a la oferta de trabajo: Desarrollos recientes de la teoría de la imposición óptima sobre la renta," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 160(1), pages 147-173, march.
    9. da Costa, Carlos E. & Pereira, Thiago, 2014. "On the efficiency of equal sacrifice income tax schedules," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 399-418.
    10. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie Stantcheva, 2014. "Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 230-271, February.
    11. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2018. "Pareto efficient taxation and expenditures: Pre- and re-distribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 101-119.
    12. Emmanuel Saez, 2001. "Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(1), pages 205-229.
    13. Jacobs, Bas & Jongen, Egbert L.W. & Zoutman, Floris T., 2017. "Revealed social preferences of Dutch political parties," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 81-100.
    14. Thomas Aronsson & Olof Johansson-Stenman, 2024. "Income Taxation and Ability Rank," Graz Economics Papers 2024-21, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    15. Tomer Blumkin & Efraim Sadka & Yotam Shem-Tov, 2015. "International tax competition: zero tax rate at the top re-established," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(5), pages 760-776, October.
    16. Louis Kaplow, 2022. "Optimal Income Taxation," NBER Working Papers 30199, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Aronsson, Thomas & Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2023. "Optimal Taxation and Other-Regarding Preferences," Working Papers in Economics 837, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    18. Florian Scheuer & Joel Slemrod, 2020. "Taxation and the Superrich," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 12(1), pages 189-211, August.
    19. Støstad, Morten Nyborg & Cowell, Frank, 2024. "Inequality as an externality: Consequences for tax design," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 235(C).
    20. Laurence Ales & Antonio Andres Bellofatto & Jessie Jiaxu Wang, 2017. "Taxing Atlas: Executive Compensation, Firm Size and Their Impact on Optimal Top Income Tax Rates," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 26, pages 62-90, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    social welfare; economic efficiency; Pareto distribution; optimal taxation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sgh:gosnar:y:2023:i:1:p:41-65. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Grzegorz Konat (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sgwawpl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.