La réélection des Conseillers fédéraux: Sanctions ciblées ou résultats prédéterminés? Une analyse économétrique des réélections au Conseil fédéral

The re-elections to the Swiss Federal Government ('Federal Council') have not been much studied so far. On the basis of the 1947-1999 record, we propose an econometric model of these re-elections, consisting of four identities and two equations, the first of the latter explaining the score of the candidates and the second a residual category dominated by blank votes. Simulating the model, we find that the scores are predetermined - to the tune of about 50 % in recent years - by a number of systematic factors on which the candidates have no influence. The simulation residuals, i.e. the difference between the actual and the simulated scores, can however be interpreted as the personal 'sanctions' (negative or positive) inflicted on the candidates by the Federal Chambers on the basis of their action and personality. The results of some individual re-elections thus appear a good deal less 'brilliant' or, as the case may be, less 'deplorable' than would appear on first sight. We finally show that the curve of the scores and that of the requisite majorities tend to get closer and could cross before too long, meaning that non re-elections could occur in the more or less near future.