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Сравнительный Анализ Стратегий Динамического Ценообразования На Рынках Сетевых Благ В Случаях Монополии И Предконкурентного Стратегического Альянса

Author

Listed:
  • В.Е. Дементьевi
  • *
  • Е.В. Устюжанинаii
  • **

Abstract

i Центральный экономико-математический институт РАН; ii Российский экономический университет (РЭУ) им. Г.В. Плеханова, * E-mail: vedementev@rambler.ru ** E-mail: dba-guu@yandex.ru Статья подготовлена при финансовой поддержке Российского фонда фундаментальных исследований (проект 17-06-00080) "Сравнительный анализ стратегий ценообразования на рынках сетевых благ на основе экономико-математического моделирования". Аннотация. Статья посвящена исследованию стратегий ценообразования на рынках сетевых благ. Для таких рынков характерно существование критической массы потребителей блага. В статье анализируется, как использование динамического ценообразования ради форсированного наращивания числа потребителей может сказаться на величине чистого приведенного дохода поставщика-монополиста. Рассматриваются два варианта динамического ценообразования. В одном варианте цены устанавливаются в некоторой пропорции от реальной полезности блага для потребителя, величина которой зависит от уже существующего числа пользователей данного блага. Другой вариант ценообразования - двухрежимный: на первом этапе для ускоренного формирования критической массы покупателей сетевое благо предоставляется им бесплатно; на втором этапе цена устанавливается в пропорции к полезности блага, как и в первом варианте. Для обоих вариантов на условных примерах показаны режимы ценообразования, соответствующие установке на максимизацию чистого приведенного дохода. Решение задачи достижения критической массы потребителей оказывается особенно сложным, когда необходим высокий уровень капитальных затрат. Возможным выходом из положения является создание стратегических альянсов. В статье рассматривается ситуация, когда после такой предконкурентной кооперации ее участники выбирают разные режимы ценообразования. Один участник делает ставку на опережающее конкурента увеличение своей рыночной доли за счет более низких цен. Второй участник стремится воспользоваться обеспечиваемым конкурентом разогревом рынка сетевого блага. Интенсивность реакции потребителей на различия в ценах поставщиков может рассматриваться в качестве одной их характеристик рынка. В статье анализируется влияние изменения этой характеристики на результаты действий конкурентов с разными режимами ценообразования.

Suggested Citation

  • В.Е. Дементьевi & * & Е.В. Устюжанинаii & **, 2019. "Сравнительный Анализ Стратегий Динамического Ценообразования На Рынках Сетевых Благ В Случаях Монополии И Предконкурентного Стратегического Альянса," Журнал Экономика и математические методы (ЭММ), Центральный Экономико-Математический Институт (ЦЭМИ), vol. 55(1), pages 16-31, январь.
    • Handle: RePEc:scn:cememm:v:55:y:2019:i:1:p:16-31
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    References listed on IDEAS

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