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Институциональное Усиление: Три Типа Отношений

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  • ЕРЗНКЯН БАГРАТ АЙКОВИЧ

    (Центральный экономико-математический институт Российской академии наук)

Abstract

В статье освещаются вопросы, связанные с концепцией институционального усиления, ассоциируемой как с эндогенными институциональными изменениями и институциональным воспроизводством, так и с иными институциональными феноменами. Понятие институционального усиления анализируется через призму трех отношений между институтами в диахронии, между институтами и их носителями в синхронии и между контрагентами при выборе ими того или иного типа института в качестве механизма регулирования трансакции. Для характеристики первого типа отношений используются понятия институционального усиления и квазипараметров эндогенно меняющихся параметров бесконечно повторяющейся игры, напрямую не обусловливающих поведение игроков. Вызываемые институтами изменения квазипараметров могут их усилить или ослабить. Усиление относится к случаю, когда изменения квазипараметров приводят к самоподдерживающемуся поведению. Для характеристики второго типа отношений вводится разграничение между стандартным типом агента мотивированным на достижение экономических целей «человеком экономическим» и вводимым в качестве альтернативы типом, известным как «человек институциональный», действующим под влиянием институтов и мотивированным на изменение своего институционального положения. Необходимость в обращении к третьему типу отношений возникает в ситуации институционального выбора, когда экономические агенты оказываются перед дилеммой, какой из институтов или какую их комбинацию предпочесть в качестве механизма осуществления трансакции. Примерами такого выбора служат формальные институциональные механизмы контрактов и неформальные доверия, могущие при их совместном использовании как усилить, так и ослабить взаимоотношения контрагентов. Особенности институционального усиления во всех типах отношений обсуждаются применительно к стационарной и нестационарной экономике, имея в виду, прежде всего, нестационарную экономику России.

Suggested Citation

  • Ерзнкян Баграт Айкович, 2017. "Институциональное Усиление: Три Типа Отношений," Journal of Institutional Studies Journal of Institutional Studies (Журнал институциональных исследований), CyberLeninka;Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «Гуманитарные перспективы», vol. 9(1), pages 27-38.
    • Handle: RePEc:scn:026034:17010675
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