Mecanismos de Admissão de Candidatos às Instituições. Modelagem e Análise à Luz da Teoria dos Jogos

This work is motivated by the problems detected in the admission of candidates to graduate Economic Schools in Brazil. From the game theoretic analysis of the observed phenomena, we concluded that the failure of the admission procedures, which has been used up to now, is due to the decentralization of the market and to the instability of the outcomes. This instability is verified when some candidate, c, with a score higher than the score of other candidate assigned to a given school, would prefer to have been assigned to that school. The market restrictions suggest a non-cooperative model in which schools behave straightforwardly. For these kind of markets we show that there is one and only one centralized institution admission mechanism, which yields stable outcomes and incentivates the participants to declare their true preferences, among all such mechanisrns. In any other case the strategic possibilities of the candidates are analysed and several theoretic results are presented.