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Land Leasing and Local Public Finance in China’s Regional Development: Evidence from Prefecture-level Cities

Author

Listed:
  • Ran Tao

    (School of Economics at Renmin University of China, 59 ZhongguanCun Street, Haidian District, Beijing, 100872, China, rantao1972@ruc.edu.cn)

  • Fubing Su

    (Department of Political Science, Vassar College, 124 Raymond Avenue, Poughkeepsie, New York, 12604, USA, fusu@vassar.edu)

  • Mingxing Liu

    (China Institute for Education Finance Research, Peking University, Beijing, China, mingxingliu@pku.edu.cn)

  • Guangzhong Cao

    (College of Urban and Environmental Sciences, Peking University, Beijing, 100871, China, caogzh@urban.pku.edu.cn)

Abstract

By analysing the evolution of local governments’ roles in different periods of China’s growth in transition, this paper explores local fiscal incentives to use subsidised land and infrastructure as key instruments in regional competition for manufacturing investment since the mid 1990s. Local land development behaviour is related to China’s current land use institutions and intergovernmental arrangements. On the basis of panel data covering prefectural-level cities from 1999 to 2003, the paper empirically identifies and compares the fiscal impacts of different forms of land leasing (by negotiation versus by auction/tender). Policy implications are drawn from this analysis, for the further reform of China’s urban land system and fiscal institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Ran Tao & Fubing Su & Mingxing Liu & Guangzhong Cao, 2010. "Land Leasing and Local Public Finance in China’s Regional Development: Evidence from Prefecture-level Cities," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 47(10), pages 2217-2236, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:urbstu:v:47:y:2010:i:10:p:2217-2236
    DOI: 10.1177/0042098009357961
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    References listed on IDEAS

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