If Planning is Anything, Maybe it Can be Identified

S ummary. A number of writers have pointed out that the word 'planning' is used so loosely that it can describe almost any approach to policy-making or decision-making. This paper asks whether it is in fact possible to identify planning as an analytically distinct method of informing and making public policies and decisions. (Clearly, it will not be empirically distinct, since in practice, policies and decisions will also reflect the influence of other 'methods', such as relying upon the market, or upon the ballot box). To permit the examination of this question, four such analytically distinct methods of decision-making, of which planning is one, are each set out in ideal-type form. Planning, since it is less readily comprehended, is set out in more detail than are the other three. This is done by breaking it down into its most characteristic 'constituent ideas'. Examination of these 'constituent ideas' of planning thought suggests that they fall into two groups. Firstly, we can distinguish a collection of ideas, each of which has intellectual credibility, but none of which seems logically or empirically to be the prerogative of planning; any policy-making, planned or unplanned, would seem able to make use of them. Secondly we can distinguish among the 'constituent ideas' of planning thought a group which are not intellectually credible, since their meaning is unclear. It is therefore concluded that planning cannot be an analytically distinct method of informing and making p ublic policies and decisions.