Are Fiscal Transfers and Bail-Outs the Perpetrators? A Study on Moral Hazard Problem in Indian Federal Finance
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DOI: 10.1177/22779787241295825
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More about this item
Keywords
Fiscal federalism; revenue effort; panel regression; moral hazard; soft-budget constraint;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
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