IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/sagope/v9y2019i1p2158244018817141.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Should and Does Compulsory Voting Reduce Inequality?

Author

Listed:
  • Karel Kouba
  • Stanislav Mysicka

Abstract

The principal defense of compulsory voting suggests that it bridges socioeconomic inequalities by fostering a higher, and hence less socioeconomically biased, turnout. However, this article argues that this does not automatically translate into a less biased political voice because compulsory voting also generates socioeconomically biased invalid votes, which is demonstrated on the case of Ecuador. Normatively, we deny the existence of a general moral and legal duty to vote, which would justify compelling a citizen to vote. Achieving higher levels of social equality does not automatically take priority over a citizen’s rights to liberty and conscience. Furthermore, we object in general to the paternalistic justification of compulsory voting made by its defenders. Thus, we find that instituting compulsory voting as an instrument of reducing class inequalities is unwarranted both empirically and normatively.

Suggested Citation

  • Karel Kouba & Stanislav Mysicka, 2019. "Should and Does Compulsory Voting Reduce Inequality?," SAGE Open, , vol. 9(1), pages 21582440188, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:sagope:v:9:y:2019:i:1:p:2158244018817141
    DOI: 10.1177/2158244018817141
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2158244018817141
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/2158244018817141?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shane P. Singh, 2015. "Compulsory Voting and the Turnout Decision Calculus," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 63(3), pages 548-568, August.
    2. Alberto Chong & Mauricio Olivera, 2008. "Does Compulsory Voting Help Equalize Incomes?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 391-415, November.
    3. Francis O'Toole & Eric Strobl, 1995. "Compulsory Voting And Government Spending," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 271-280, November.
    4. Sarah Birch, 2009. "The case for compulsory voting," Public Policy Review, Institute for Public Policy Research, vol. 16(1), pages 21-27, March.
    5. Singh, Shane P., 2018. "Compulsory Voting and Dissatisfaction with Democracy," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 843-854, July.
    6. Lever, Annabelle, 2010. "Compulsory Voting: A Critical Perspective," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(4), pages 897-915, October.
    7. Jaitman, Laura, 2013. "The causal effect of compulsory voting laws on turnout: Does skill matter?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 79-93.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dalibor Eterovic & Nicolas Eterovic, 2010. "Political Competition vs. PoliticalParticipation: Effects on Government's Size," Working Papers wp_006, Adolfo Ibáñez University, School of Government.
    2. Dalibor Eterovic & Nicolás Eterovic, 2012. "Political competition versus electoral participation: effects on government’s size," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 333-363, December.
    3. Sebastian Garmann, 2020. "Political efficacy and the persistence of turnout shocks," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(3), pages 411-429, November.
    4. Jaitman, Laura, 2013. "The causal effect of compulsory voting laws on turnout: Does skill matter?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 79-93.
    5. Ciancio, Alberto & Kämpfen, Fabrice, 2023. "The heterogeneous effects of internet voting," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    6. Guizzo Altube, Matías & Scartascini, Carlos & Tommasi, Mariano, 2023. "The Political Economy of Redistribution and (in)Efficiency in Latin America and the Caribbean," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 13194, Inter-American Development Bank.
    7. Davis, Lewis S., 2018. "Political economy of growth with a taste for status," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 35-46.
    8. Hoffman, Mitchell & León, Gianmarco & Lombardi, María, 2017. "Compulsory voting, turnout, and government spending: Evidence from Austria," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 103-115.
    9. Juan José Matta, 2009. "El Efecto del Voto Obligatorio Sobre las Políticas Redistributivas: Teoría y Evidencia para un Corte Transversal de Países," Working Papers ClioLab 3, EH Clio Lab. Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.
    10. Milanovic, Branko, 2010. "Four critiques of the redistribution hypothesis: An assessment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 147-154, March.
    11. Jang-Sup Shin, 2018. "The Subversion of Shareholder Democracy and the Rise of Hedge-Fund Activism," Working Papers Series 77, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
    12. Selim Jürgen Ergun, 2015. "Centrist’S Curse? An Electoral Competition Model With Credibility Constraints," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 60(05), pages 1-18, December.
    13. Gäbler, Stefanie & Potrafke, Niklas & Rösel, Felix, 2017. "Compulsory Voting, Voter Turnout and Asymmetrical Habit-formation," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168074, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    14. Alberto Chong & Mauricio Olivera, 2005. "On Compulsory Voting and Income Inequality in a Cross-Section of Countries," Research Department Publications 4413, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    15. Gaebler, Stefanie & Potrafke, Niklas & Roesel, Felix, 2020. "Compulsory voting and political participation: Empirical evidence from Austria," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    16. Niklas Potrafke & Felix Roesel, 2020. "Opening hours of polling stations and voter turnout: Evidence from a natural experiment," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 133-163, January.
    17. Rauh, Christopher, 2017. "Voting, education, and the Great Gatsby Curve," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 1-14.
    18. Claudia Landwehr & Armin Schäfer, 2023. "The promise of representative democracy: deliberative responsiveness," Working Papers 2309, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.
    19. Ognjen Arandjelović, 2023. "A Modest Proposal for Preventing the Votes of People with Short Life Expectancy from Being a Long-Term Burden to Their Country," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-8, March.
    20. Alberto Chong & Mauricio Olivera, 2005. "Votación obligatoria y desigualdad del ingreso en una muestra representativa de países," Research Department Publications 4414, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:sagope:v:9:y:2019:i:1:p:2158244018817141. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.