Economic Policy without Politics

Commentators on market-oriented policy reform, e.g. John Williamson and Naomi Klein, have observed that radical policy change is often enacted in the wake of a “crisis†which is perceived to necessitate and justify the change. In section 2, I critically examine Williamson’s work and his analysis of the enabling conditions of policy changes based on the “Washington Consensus.†I also consider Klein’s work, and use, as a case study, the economic reforms in Chile in the 1970s. Whilst Williamson and Klein provide insights into the introduction of policy change, they do not offer plausible accounts of its persistence after a crisis has passed. Drawing on insights from behavioral economics, an explanation of persistence is offered (section 3). In section 4, the notion of “politics†contained in the work of proponents of market-oriented policy reform is scrutinized. I conclude with remarks on strategies for resisting market-oriented policy change.