IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/reorpe/v34y2002i4p463-486.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Wages fund, high wages, and social conflict in a classical model of unemployment equilibrium

Author

Listed:
  • Guglielmo Forges Davanzati

    (Filosofia e Scienze Sociali, Universita Di Lecce, via VM. Stampacchia Palazzo Parlangeli, 1 73100 Lecce, Italyforges@cds.unina.it)

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to provide an explanation of involuntary unemployment in a classical (post-Ricardian) framework. The model describes a three-stage bargaining process with four agents (governments, firms, unions, workers). In the first stage, firms determine the wage offered, following a short-run version of the wages fund theory. In the second stage, unionists determine the wage demanded, which depends on workers' tendency to conflict, while firms decide the number of employed under a "right to manage" hypothesis. In the third stage, governments tax the wages fund and pay unemployment benefits. Public intervention is subject to a trade-off between accumulation and legitimation.

Suggested Citation

  • Guglielmo Forges Davanzati, 2002. "Wages fund, high wages, and social conflict in a classical model of unemployment equilibrium," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 34(4), pages 463-486, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:reorpe:v:34:y:2002:i:4:p:463-486
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://rrp.sagepub.com/content/34/4/463.abstract
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:reorpe:v:34:y:2002:i:4:p:463-486. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.urpe.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.