Markets, Norms, and Peasant Rebellions

In this article, we present a set of theoretical speculations about peasant norms that differ from those of earlier theorists: (1) Premarket peasant norms, that is, reciprocity, are a product of incentive-guided and self-interested behavior. For example, in the premarket environment, extended kinship obligations served as social insurance. (2) The evolution of markets can be beneficial for peasants. Peasants did not necessarily have to be coerced into abandoning premarket norms. Specialization led to the possibility of accumulating savings, which could substitute for the premarket institutions. (3) Peasant violence or rebellion is rarely a reaction to the emergence of markets per se, nor is it due to innate cultural predilections. Rather, peasant violence is often a response to the monopoly of control by elites over the surpluses created by markets. These claims are theoretically substantiated by simple applications of models of noncooperative games and illustrated with various sketches of examples from Western European (mainly French) economic history. The claims are contrasted with more traditional views on the impact of markets on peasant norms. The conclusive settlement of substantive issues in the study of peasant politics is not our goal; rather, we hope to clarify the arguments by directing attention to the assumptions upon which empirical results are derived.