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The Relative Efficiency of Approval and Condorcet Voting Procedures

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  • SAMUEL MERRILL III

    (Wilkes University)

  • NICOLAUS TIDEMAN

    (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University)

Abstract

This article compares empirically the average utility for the electorate of the candidates selected by approval voting and by ranking-based voting with a search for a Condorcet winner (a Condorcet-completion procedure). “Feeling thermometer†scores from the presidential election surveys for 1972 through 1984 of the Institute for Survey Research are used for distributions of utilities of candidates for voters. Several hypotheses about voting behavior under approval voting are explored, while voters using a Condorcet completion procedure are assumed to rank the candidates according to the utility they offer. The average social utilities of the candidates chosen by these voting systems are remarkably similar, while that for single-vote plurality (under sincere voting) is significantly lower.

Suggested Citation

  • Samuel Merrill Iii & Nicolaus Tideman, 1991. "The Relative Efficiency of Approval and Condorcet Voting Procedures," Rationality and Society, , vol. 3(1), pages 65-77, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:3:y:1991:i:1:p:65-77
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463191003001005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brams, Steven J., 1982. "Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections," Working Papers 82-03, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    2. Bordley, Robert F., 1983. "A Pragmatic Method for Evaluating Election Schemes through Simulation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 123-141, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lachat, Romain & Laslier, Jean-François, 2024. "Alternatives to plurality rule for single-winner elections: When do they make a difference?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    2. James Green-Armytage & T. Tideman & Rafael Cosman, 2016. "Statistical evaluation of voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 183-212, January.

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