On the Formation of Exchange Relations in Political Systems

Structural analysis has paid little attention to the formation of social ties. This article inquires into the origin of one type of tie, the exchange relationship, in a specific context, the political arena. The article focuses on the link between the configuration of actors' interests and the likelihood of exchange. Using the conceptual framework underlying Coleman's model of purposive action, two aspects of the interest configuration are specified: complementarity and ideological dissimilarity. Complementarity refers to the extent to which actors attach dissimilar importance to events in the political system, while ideological dissimilarity reflects the extent to which actors have different preferences for event outcomes. Prior work on social exchange makes the importance of complementarity clear, but this article holds that ideological dissimilarity impedes formation of exchange relations because it creates a lack of trust and a fear of harmful externalities. Informal experimental results are presented which provide initial support for this hypothesis. Possible extensions of the work are discussed.