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The Dilemma of Social Democracy in 1914

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  • Francisco Herreros

Abstract

In 1914, socialist parties voted in favour of war credits. This was a surprising decision given their pre-war commitment to the keeping of peace. The decision has usually been explained by the so-called chauvinist preferences of the socialist leaders. In this article, an alternative hypothesis is advanced. A game theoretic model is used to explain why socialist parties betrayed their pre-war commitments. It is maintained that the socialist parties' voting decision is compatible with pacifist preferences. The game theoretic model indicates that socialist parties were trapped in a coordination problem that they could not solve. They voted in favour of war credits even though they were pacifists because they could not coordinate themselves in a joint negative vote. This conclusion goes against the common perception of historical fact.

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco Herreros, 2003. "The Dilemma of Social Democracy in 1914," Rationality and Society, , vol. 15(3), pages 325-344, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:15:y:2003:i:3:p:325-344
    DOI: 10.1177/10434631030153002
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