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Public Provision of Indivisible Private Goods in Short Supply

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  • Dan Usher

    (Queen’s University)

Abstract

Public provision of private goods is usually modeled as the displacement of a market where people can buy as much or as little of a good as they please, with tax-financed provision by the government of equal and identical amounts of the good per person. But public provision is not always equal per person because some goods cannot be supplied equally or because the government does not choose to supply goods equally. There may be fewer organs available for transplant than there are people who need them. The best education and medical care are unavoidably rationed because teachers and doctors differ in skill or dedication. Total public expenditure may be insufficient to provide for everybody when there is a lower limit to useful expenditure per person.

Suggested Citation

  • Dan Usher, 2002. "Public Provision of Indivisible Private Goods in Short Supply," Public Finance Review, , vol. 30(5), pages 385-415, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:30:y:2002:i:5:p:385-415
    DOI: 10.1177/109114210203000505
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Usher, Dan, 1977. "The welfare economics of the socialization of commodities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 151-168, October.
    2. Dan Usher, 2002. "Public Provision of Indivisible Private Goods in Short Supply," Public Finance Review, , vol. 30(5), pages 385-415, September.
    3. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1996. "Public Provision of Private Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 57-84, February.
    4. Garratt, Rod & Marshall, John M, 1994. "Public Finance of Private Goods: The Case of College Education," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 566-582, June.
    5. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E., 1996. "Ends against the middle: Determining public service provision when there are private alternatives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 297-325, November.
    6. repec:eee:labchp:v:1:y:1986:i:c:p:641-692 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Kennett, David, 1982. "Standards and Procedures for the Distribution of a Public Service: Shoup Revisited," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 37(1), pages 80-97.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dan Usher, 2002. "Public Provision of Indivisible Private Goods in Short Supply," Public Finance Review, , vol. 30(5), pages 385-415, September.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods

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