IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/pubfin/v21y1993i1p84-99.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

An Economic Investigation of Interstate Variation in Legislative Turnover

Author

Listed:
  • Kenneth V. Greene

    (State University of New York at Binghamton)

Abstract

The explanations of turnover in legislatures developed by political scientists are combined with an economic cartel model of the organization of legislatures to explain interstate variation in turnover in the period 1972-1986. Few robustly significant determinants are found and the results question the applicability of the theory of industrial organization to this area of political organization .

Suggested Citation

  • Kenneth V. Greene, 1993. "An Economic Investigation of Interstate Variation in Legislative Turnover," Public Finance Review, , vol. 21(1), pages 84-99, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:21:y:1993:i:1:p:84-99
    DOI: 10.1177/109114219302100104
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/109114219302100104
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/109114219302100104?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Crain, W Mark, 1977. "On the Structure and Stability of Political Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(4), pages 829-842, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Casey B. Mulligan & Ricard Gil & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2004. "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 51-74, Winter.
    2. Randall Holcombe, 1986. "Non-optimal unanimous agreement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 229-244, January.
    3. Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, 1993. "Political Regimes and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 51-69, Summer.
    4. Yogesh Uppal & Amihai Glazer, 2015. "Legislative Turnover, Fiscal Policy, And Economic Growth: Evidence From U.S. State Legislatures," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(1), pages 91-107, January.
    5. Randall Holcombe, 1989. "A note on seniority and political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 285-288, June.
    6. Stephen Calabrese, 2007. "An explanation of the continuing federal government mandate of single-member congressional districts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 23-40, January.
    7. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    8. Germeshausen, Robert & Heim, Sven & Wagner, Ulrich J., 2021. "Support for renewable energy: The case of wind power," ZEW Discussion Papers 21-074, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    9. Casey B. Mulligan & Kevin K. Tsui, 2006. "Political Competitiveness," NBER Working Papers 12653, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. William Brown & Gary Santoni, 1980. "Economic competition and political competition: A comment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 27-36, January.
    11. Russell Sobel & Matt Ryan, 2012. "Seniority and anti-competitive restrictions on the legislative common pool: tenure’s impact on the overall production of legislation and the concentration of political benefits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 171-190, October.
    12. Garrett, Thomas A, 1999. "A Test of Shirking under Legislative and Citizen Vote: The Case of State Lottery Adoption," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 189-208, April.
    13. Randall G. Holcombe, 1991. "Barriers to Entry and Political Competition," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(2), pages 231-240, April.
    14. W. Mark Crain & Robert D. Tollison & Thomas H. Deaton, 1991. "The Price of Influence in an Interest-Group Economy," Rationality and Society, , vol. 3(4), pages 437-449, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:21:y:1993:i:1:p:84-99. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.