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Leviathan and Federalism in the United States

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  • Henry J. Raimondo

    (University of Massachusetts, Boston)

Abstract

This article is an empirical examination of the "Leviathan hypothesis" developed by economists Brennan and Buchanan (1980). The hypothesis states that as individuals turn over control of public spending to higher levels of government, the preferences of the politicians, bureaucrats, and special-interest lobbyists who determine fiscal policy at these higher levels of government replace the tastes and preferences of the individual for the amount of spending and taxing. This transfer of control from decentralized to centralized decisionmaking and this replacement of taxing for individual preferences by political-bureaucratic preferences toward spending lead to an expansion of the public sector. Regression analysis shows support for the hypothesis in specific public-service areas .

Suggested Citation

  • Henry J. Raimondo, 1989. "Leviathan and Federalism in the United States," Public Finance Review, , vol. 17(2), pages 204-215, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:17:y:1989:i:2:p:204-215
    DOI: 10.1177/109114218901700204
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Oates, Wallace E, 1985. "Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 748-757, September.
    2. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lars Feld, 2014. "James Buchanan’s theory of federalism: from fiscal equity to the ideal political order," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 231-252, September.
    2. Michael Marlow, 1997. "Public education supply and student performance," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(5), pages 617-626.
    3. Gebhard Kirchgassner, 2002. "The effects of fiscal institutions on public finance: a survey of the empirical evidence," Chapters, in: Stanley L. Winer & Hirofumi Shibata (ed.), Political Economy and Public Finance, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Lars P. Feld & Gebhard Kirchgässner & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2010. "Decentralized Taxation and the Size of Government: Evidence from Swiss State and Local Governments," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 77(1), pages 27-48, July.

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