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Social knowledge and international policymaking at the World Bank

Author

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  • John Toye

    (Department of International Development Oxford University, UK)

Abstract

The production of social knowledge in all international organizations is problematic because all are public bureaucracies. The World Bank provides a case study of the problems of managing in-house research in an international public bureaucracy. Not only are there managerial constraints on what the Bank is willing to publish, but the binding constraints on publication evolve. The evolution in managerial objectives at the Bank in recent years and the factors that have influenced shifts in its rhetoric and policy are examined. Are these adjustments merely rhetorical? Recent research on poverty reduction, governance and conditionality is discussed to gauge how far the Bank has moved.

Suggested Citation

  • John Toye, 2009. "Social knowledge and international policymaking at the World Bank," Progress in Development Studies, , vol. 9(4), pages 297-310, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:prodev:v:9:y:2009:i:4:p:297-310
    DOI: 10.1177/146499340900900404
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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