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Monetary and Financial Stability: So Close and Yet So Far?

Author

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  • Claudio Borio

    (Bank for International Settlements, Claudio.Borio@bis.org)

Abstract

This paper argues that changes in the financial and monetary regimes since the early 1980s may have made it more likely that financial factors in general, and the booms and busts in credit and asset prices in particular, act as drivers of economic fluctuations. As a result, the current environment may be more vulnerable to the occasional build-up of financial imbalances, ie. overextensions in (private sector) balance sheets that herald economic weakness and disinflation down the road, as they unwind, raising also the risk of financial strains and possibly even broader financial instability. Achieving simultaneously monetary and financial stability may call for some significant refinements to current policy frameworks, based on closer cooperation between prudential and monetary authorities. These refinements include a strengthening of the macroprudential orientation of regulatory and supervisory frameworks ensuring that monetary frameworks allow enough room for manoeuvre to lean pre-emptively against the build-up of the imbalances.

Suggested Citation

  • Claudio Borio, 2005. "Monetary and Financial Stability: So Close and Yet So Far?," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 192(1), pages 84-101, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:niesru:v:192:y:2005:i:1:p:84-101
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    Cited by:

    1. Sandra Eickmeier & Boris Hofmann & Andreas Worms, 2009. "Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Bank Lending: Evidence for Germany and the Euro Area," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 10(2), pages 193-223, May.
    2. Fazio, Dimas Mateus & Silva, Thiago Christiano & Tabak, Benjamin Miranda & Cajueiro, Daniel Oliveira, 2018. "Inflation targeting and financial stability: Does the quality of institutions matter?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 1-15.
    3. Persaud, Avinash, 2009. "Macro-Prudential Regulation," ECMI Papers 1712, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    4. Xiao Weiguo & Zhao Yang & Yuan Wei, 2013. "Liquidity Characteristics, Implicit Information of Asset Prices and Monetary Policy in China," Journal for Economic Forecasting, Institute for Economic Forecasting, vol. 0(4), pages 56-66, December.
    5. repec:bla:germec:v:10:y:2009:i::p:193-223 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Avinash Persaud, 2009. "Macro-Prudential Regulation," World Bank Publications - Reports 10243, The World Bank Group.
    7. Ábel, István & Mérő, Katalin, 2024. "A bankszabályozás lehetőségei és korlátai az endogén pénzelmélet keretében. A bankok puha költségvetési korlátja [Possibilities and limits of banking regulation in the endogenous money theory frame," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(6), pages 604-623.
    8. Gunther Tichy, 2010. "War die Finanzkrise vorhersehbar?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 11(4), pages 356-382, November.
    9. Gabriel Barros Tavares Peixoto & Gabriel Caldas Montes, 2014. "Risk-Taking Channel, Bank Lendingchannel And The “Paradox Of Credibility”: Empirical Evidence For Brazil," Anais do XL Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 40th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 030, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    10. Panzera, Fabio S., 2011. "Price stability and financial imbalances: rethinking the macrofinancial framework after the 2007-8 financial crisis," FSES Working Papers 423, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Freiburg/Fribourg Switzerland.
    11. Gertler, Pavel & Hofmann, Boris, 2018. "Monetary facts revisited," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 154-170.
    12. Gabriel Caldas Montes & José Américo Pereira Antunes & Alexei Ferreira Araújo, 2021. "Effects of monetary policy and credibility on financial intermediation: evidence from the Brazilian banking sector," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 60(3), pages 1191-1219, March.
    13. János Kálmán, 2016. "Bank resolution as a new MNB function – resolution of MKB BankAdministrative law aspects of the macroprudential regulation and supervision of the financial intermediary system – normativity, organisat," Financial and Economic Review, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), vol. 15(3), pages 27-50.
    14. Frankel, Jeffrey A., 2009. "On Global Currencies," Scholarly Articles 4448879, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
    15. Akram, Q. Farooq & Eitrheim, Øyvind, 2008. "Flexible inflation targeting and financial stability: Is it enough to stabilize inflation and output?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(7), pages 1242-1254, July.
    16. Alexander Erler & Christian Drescher & Damir Križanac, 2013. "The Fed’s TRAP," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 37(1), pages 136-149, January.
    17. Peter Docherty & Ron Bird & Timo Henckel & Gordon Menzies, 2016. "Australian prudential regulation before and after the global financial crisis," CAMA Working Papers 2016-49, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    18. Leni Hunter & Adrian Orr & Bruce White, 2006. "Towards a framework for promoting financial stability in New Zealand," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 69, pages 1-17., March.
    19. Nouriel Roubini, 2006. "Why Central Banks Should Burst Bubbles," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(1), pages 87-107, May.
    20. Montes, Gabriel Caldas & Peixoto, Gabriel Barros Tavares, 2014. "Risk-taking channel, bank lending channel and the “paradox of credibility”," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 82-94.
    21. Leon Wansleben, 2021. "Divisions of regulatory labor, institutional closure, and structural secrecy in new regulatory states: The case of neglected liquidity risks in market‐based banking," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 909-932, July.

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