The Role of I.L.O. Standards in the Global Integration Process

This article investigates how the I.L.O. standards have been utilized by the member states as instruments in the integration process. Data are presented to illuminate two basic questions:1) Which states ratify which conventions, and why?2) Is the impetus behind the development of the system of I.L.O. conventions into an instrument in the global integration process, political or functional in nature ?The study is based partly on a historical survey and partly on an investigation carried out by methods used in political science and in international law. The two main hypotheses are these:1) As the I.L.O. conventions are principally adapted to fit into the systems in 'rich countries', the conventions play their greatest rôle in integration processes involving industrialized countries.2)What is decisive for a government's acceding to an I.L.O. convention is whether the convention calls for expensive national measures, and whether the state has sufficient administrative capacity and/or adequate basis in its national economy.From this survey and investigation we may establish the following: The 'club' of dominating industrial states which created the I.L.O. and formulated its policy managed to get the rest of the world to accept their programme. The number of member states outside Europe grew slowly during the first thirty years of the I.L.O.'s existence, and no strong group of states entered the I.L.O. en bloc, or otherwise con stituted a threatening faction to the established organization.I.L.O. conventions are mostly in use as instruments in the process of integration among the industrialized countries. As the reason for low ratification frequency is not political differences between the member states, we must seek it in lacking adminis trative capacity or weak economy.There is clear correlation between ratification frequencies and the gross domestic product of states concerned. Again, a state's economic conditions are decisive for its ratifying I.L.O. conventions, while political systems seem to be unimportant in this respect. Indeed, it seems quite rare that political considerations prevent ratification of vital I.L.O. conventions.