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The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-85

Author

Listed:
  • John R. Oneal
  • Frances H. Oneal

    (Department of Political Science, University of Alabama)

  • Zeev Maoz

    (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University)

  • Bruce Russett

    (Department of Political Science, Yale University)

Abstract

The classical liberals believed that democracy and free trade would reduce the incidence of war. Here we conduct new tests of the `democratic peace', incorporating into the analyses of Maoz & Russett (1993) a measure of economic interdependence based on the economic importance of bilateral trade. This allows us to conduct a simultaneous evaluation of the effects of regime type and interdependence on the likelihood that a pair of states will become involved in a militarized interstate dispute. We control in all our analyses for a number of potentially confounding influences: growth rates in per capita income, alliances, geographic contiguity, and relative power. Our logistic regression analyses of politically relevant dyads (1950-85) indicate that the benefits of the liberals' economic program have not been sufficiently appreciated. Trade is a powerful influence for peace, especially among the war-prone, contiguous pairs of states. Moreover, Kant (1991 [1795]) was right: International conflict is less likely when external economic relations are important, executives are constrained, and societies are governed by non-violent norms of conflict resolution.

Suggested Citation

  • John R. Oneal & Frances H. Oneal & Zeev Maoz & Bruce Russett, 1996. "The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-85," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 33(1), pages 11-28, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:joupea:v:33:y:1996:i:1:p:11-28
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Lloyd J. Dumas, 2011. "The Economics of Peacekeeping," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 28, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Jason Enia & Patrick James, 2015. "Regime Type, Peace, and Reciprocal Effects," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 96(2), pages 523-539, June.
    3. Francesco Amodio & Leonardo Baccini & Michele Di Maio, 2021. "Security, Trade, and Political Violence," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 1-37.
    4. Manuchehr Irandoust, 2018. "Militarism and globalization: Is there an empirical link?," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 1349-1369, May.
    5. Adedokun, Ayokunu, 2017. "Post-conflict peacebuilding: A critical survey of the literature and avenues for future research," MERIT Working Papers 2017-016, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    6. Susan Ariel Aaronson & M. Rodwan Abouharb & K. Daniel Wang, 2015. "The Liberal Illusion Is Not a Complete Delusion: The WTO Helps Member States Keep the Peace Only When It Increases Trade," Global Economy Journal (GEJ), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(4), pages 455-484, December.
    7. Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), 2011. "The Handbook on the Political Economy of War," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13385.
    8. Strüver, Georg, 2010. "Too Many Resources or Too Few? What Drives International Conflicts?," GIGA Working Papers 147, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    9. Sebastian Rosato, 2011. "On the Democratic Peace," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 15, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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