Author
Abstract
Many scholars and policy-makers have assumed that reduction of US and Russian strategic nuclear forces to the lowest possible levels, perhaps to zero, is contributory to deterrence and crisis stability. This study tests a variety of reduced US and Russian nuclear forces, including hypothetical forces and START configurations, for their relative force advantage and for their ability to fulfil previously accepted standards of assured retaliation. It turns out that, as forces decrease towards very low levels, the Russian force falls behind the US force in operational flexibility and becomes much more vulnerable to surprise strikes without warning. Both forces maintain the ability to inflict historically unprecedented retaliatory damage even at the 1,000 warhead level, the lowest included here. The good news is that minimum deterrent forces rapidly run out of plausible targets, making them irrelevant for counterforce first strikes or for escalation dominance. The bad news is that minimum forces can become exclusively city attacking forces by default. Former adversaries now turned into potential partners in search of regional and global stability, the USA and Russia must safeguard the transition from a nuclear deterrence regime to a more disarmed world. The reduction of US and Russian arsenals to several hundreds of weapons is contributory to stability on the assumption that the British, French and Chinese nuclear weapons inventories undergo proportionate reductions also. A second assumption built into favorable prognoses for US and Russian reductions well below START levels is that nuclear proliferation can be constrained. Absent constrained proliferation and cooperative European and Asian nuclear powers, US and Russian force reductions below 1,000 warheads are ambiguously stable. Neorealist arguments in favor of well-managed proliferation understate the extent to which Cold War stability was overdetermined. US-Soviet nuclear deterrence rested on a substructure that included bipolarity and learned behavior modification for crisis management.
Suggested Citation
Stephen J. Cimbala, 1995.
"Deterrence Stability with Smaller Forces: Prospects and Problems,"
Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 32(1), pages 65-78, February.
Handle:
RePEc:sae:joupea:v:32:y:1995:i:1:p:65-78
Download full text from publisher
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:joupea:v:32:y:1995:i:1:p:65-78. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.prio.no/ .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through
the various RePEc services.