The Modernization of the US Radar Installation at Thule, Greenland

A controversial arms control issue in the 1980s was the US-Soviet dispute concerning new or modernized radars which were claimed to violate the ABM Treaty. The new US Large Phased-Array Radar at Thule, Greenland, became a major issue in the Danish security policy debate, particularly in early 1987, when several claims were made in the Danish media and the Danish Parliament concerning the radar's function and potential capabilities. As the US military facilities in Greenland have rarely been at the forefront of the political debate in Denmark, it is not surprising that both the political and media debate have been riddled with speculations and contradictory assertions. The political debate in Denmark resulted in a resolution adopted by a broad majority in the Danish Parliament, stressing that the radar should not be used in a future SDI or ABM system. This article discusses the strategic rationale behind the modernization decision as expressed by the US Air Force in testimony before the US Congress. I argue that the purpose of the modernization was to enhance the quality of attack warning and attack assessment data so crucial to a nuclear warfighting strategy. Various claims which were aired in the Danish debate are assessed; and I maintain that the radar is unlikely to be of substantial utility in a future ABM or SDI system, that the modernization did not violate the spirit of the ABM treaty; that the radar is able to perform certain spacetracking missions; and that data collected from the Thule array could be relevant for a potential future US ASAT system.