Extended Deterrence, Superpower Control, and Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1962-76

This paper hypothesizes two pacifying effects of superpower control on international relations: (1) If the superpowers deter each other from going to war against each other, and if they largely control the national security decision-making of their allies or clients or bloc members, then extended deterrence pacifies interbloc relations; (2) If the superpowers largely control decisions on war and peace by their bloc members, then they guarantee the avoidance of war within blocs. While my previous research (Weede, 1975a, 1975b, 1983) provided some support for these ideas, the rarity of war made it rather difficult to establish the significance of the effects which I attribute to superpower control. This paper attempts to overcome the problem by substituting militarized interstate disputes for war as the dependent variable. Since militarized disputes occur much more frequently than wars, the small numbers problem is thereby mitigated. Of course, a new substantial assumption has to be made: superpower control not only reduces the risk of war where it applies, it also tends to reduce the incidence of much lesser uses of military force. While this paper provides some support for the pacifying effects of superpower control by extended deterrence, there is no support at all for some reduction in the incidence of disputes between allies of the same superpower. This latter finding might be an early warning indicator of some future breakdown of extended deterrence.