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Inefficient voting with identical voters

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  • Ole-Andreas Elvik Naess

Abstract

This paper constructs a two-period electoral model where the future is uncertain and the policy in each period is decided by majority rule. The voters’ optimal future policy takes into account all possible future realizations, while the future pivotal median voter only cares about the median value of the future distribution. This dynamic conflict of interest implies that the electoral outcome may be strictly Pareto-dominated by other policies even in cases where all voters are identical and have the same beliefs for the future. I apply the model to analyze the dynamic incentives for redistribution.

Suggested Citation

  • Ole-Andreas Elvik Naess, 2022. "Inefficient voting with identical voters," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(2), pages 175-190, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:34:y:2022:i:2:p:175-190
    DOI: 10.1177/09516298221085973
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    References listed on IDEAS

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