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Rational Choices as Social Norms

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  • Dimitri Landa

    (726 Broadway, 7th floor, Department of Politics, New York University, New York, NY 10003, USA dimitri.landa@nyu.edu)

Abstract

This article develops an account of a theory of rational choice based on the conception of rationality as a normatively justified correspondence between interests and choices. In this conception, rationality is best thought of as a property not of individual actions, but of a complex two-level phenomenon comprised of the social justification of behavioral norms and of the everyday choices made under these norms.

Suggested Citation

  • Dimitri Landa, 2006. "Rational Choices as Social Norms," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 18(4), pages 434-453, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:18:y:2006:i:4:p:434-453
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629806067453
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Larry Samuelson, 1998. "Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262692198, April.
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